Showing posts with label H5N1. Show all posts
Showing posts with label H5N1. Show all posts

Scientists restart bioweapons research, with NIH's blessing

For more than a decade now, two scientists–one in the U.S. and one in the Netherlands–have been trying to create a deadly human pathogen from avian influenza. That's right: they are trying to turn "bird flu," which does not normally infect people, into a human flu.

Not surprisingly, many scientists are vehemently opposed to this. In mid-2014, a group of them formed the Cambridge Working Group and issued a statement warning of the dangers of this research. The statement was signed by hundreds of scientists at virtually every major U.S. and European university. (Full disclosure: I am one of the signatories.)

In response to these and other concerns, in October 2014 the U.S. government called for a "pause" in this dangerous research. NIH Director Francis Collins said that his agency would study the risks and benefits before proceeding further.

Well, four years later, the risks and benefits haven't changed, but the NIH has (quietly) just allowed the research to start again, as we learned last week in an exclusive report from Science's Jocelyn Kaiser.

I can't allow this to go unchallenged. This research is so potentially harmful, and offers such little benefit to society, that I fear that NIH is endangering the trust that Congress places in it. And don't misinterpret me: I'm a huge supporter of NIH, and I've argued before that it's one of the best investments the American public can make. But they got this one really, really wrong.

For those who might not know, the 1918 influenza pandemic, which killed between 50 and 100 million people worldwide (3% of the entire world population at the time), was caused by a strain of avian influenza that made the jump into humans. The 1918 flu was so deadly that it "killed more American soldiers and sailors during World War I than did enemy weapons."

Not surprisingly, then, when other scientists (including me) learned about the efforts to turn bird flu into a human flu, we asked: why the heck would anyone do that? The answers were and still are unsatisfactory: claims such as "we'll learn more about the pandemic potential of the flu" and "we'll be better prepared for an avian flu pandemic if one occurs." These are hand-waving arguments that may sound reasonable, but they promise only vague benefits while ignoring the dangers of this research. If the research succeeds, and one of the newly-designed, highly virulent flu strains escapes, the damage could be horrific.

One of the deadliest strains of avian flu circulating today is H5N1. This strain has occasionally jumped from birds to humans, with a mortality rate approaching 50%, far more deadly than any human flu. Fortunately, the virus has never gained the ability to be transmitted directly between humans.

That is, it didn't have this ability until two scientists, Ron Fouchier in the Netherlands and Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin, engineered it to gain this ability. (Actually, their work showed that the virus could be transmitted between ferrets, not humans, for the obvious reason that you can't ethically test this on humans.)

Well, Fouchier and Kawaoka are back at it again. NIH actually lifted the "pause" in December 2017, and invited scientists to submit proposal for this type of research. Fouchier confidently stated at the time that all he had to do was "find and replace" a few terms in his previous proposal and it would likely sail through peer review. It appears he was correct, although according to the Science article, his study has been approved but not yet actually funded. Kawaoka's project is already under way, as anyone can learn by checking the NIH grants database.

And by the way: why the heck is a U.S. funding agency supporting research in the Netherlands anyway? If Fouchier's work is so great (and it isn't), let the Netherlands fund it.

I've said it before, more than once: engineering the flu to be more virulent is a terrible idea. It appears the review process at NIH simply failed, as multiple scientists stated to Vox last week. This research has the potential to cause millions of deaths.

Fouchier, Kawaoka, and their defenders (usually other flu scientists who also benefit from the same funding) like to claim that their project to engineer a deadlier bird flu will somehow help prevent a future pandemic. This argument is, frankly, nonsense: influenza mutates while circulating among millions of birds, and no one has any idea how to predict or control that process. (I should mention that I know a little bit about the flu, having published multiple papers on it, including this paper in Nature and this paper on H5N1 avian flu.)

Fouchier and Kawaoka have also argued that we can use their work to create stockpiles of vaccines in advance. Yeah, right. We don't even stockpile vaccines for the normal seasonal flu, because it mutates too fast, so we have to produce new vaccines each year. And the notion that anyone can predict a future pandemic strain so precisely that we could design a vaccine based on their prediction is laughable.

I can't quite fathom why NIH seems to be so enraptured with the work of these two labs that, rather than simply deny them funding, it has ignored the warnings of hundreds of scientists and now risks creating a new influenza pandemic. Much as I hate to say this, maybe it's time for Congress to intervene.

Should the government allow scientists to create new super-viruses?

Let's suppose a bunch of scientists proposed to take one of the most infectious human viruses—influenza, say—and turn it into a super-bug. Is this a good idea?

Or to put it another way: should scientists be artificially mutating viruses so that they have the potential to become a worldwide pandemic?

Right about now you might be asking: is anyone actually doing this, and if so, what on earth are they thinking?

And yet, several of the world's most prominent influenza researchers have been engaged in exactly this enterprise for several years now. They call their work "gain of function" experiments, because they manipulating viruses to give them new (and very dangerous) functions.

I wrote about this last year, after a group led by Ron Fouchier at Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands and Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin announced, in a letter to Nature, that they were going to create a new strain of H7N9 influenza virus that had the potential to turn into a human pandemic. Sure enough, just a few months later, Fouchier published results showing they had done just that, although they reported that their newly engineered strain had only "limited" transmissibility between ferrets (the animal they used for all their experiments).

Fouchier and Kawaoka had already done the same thing with the deadly H5N1 "bird flu" virus, causing a huge outcry among scientists and the public. As reported in Science magazine almost three years ago, Fouchier admitted that his artificially mutated H5N1 was "probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make."

And yet he did it anyway—and then did it again, with H7N9.

Many other scientists were and are extremely concerned about these experiments, which some of us consider dangerous and irresponsible. This past July, a large group of scientists known as the Cambridge Working Group (of which I am a member) released a statement calling for a hiatus, saying:
"Experiments involving the creation of potential pandemic pathogens should be curtailed until there has been a quantitative, objective and credible assessment of the risks, potential benefits, and opportunities for risk mitigation, as well as comparison against safer experimental approaches."
Just two days ago, the U.S. government responded, announcing that it was going to take a serious look at whether creating these superbugs is a good idea. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is creating two committees to "assess the potential risks and benefits" of these experiments, particularly those involving the influenza, SARS, and MERS viruses.

Until the committees come up with recommendations, the government is halting any new funding for these experiments and asking for a voluntary "pause" on existing work.

Not surprisingly, Fouchier and his colleagues have argued that their work has benefits; that it has "contributed to our understanding of host adaptation by influenza viruses, the development of vaccines and therapeutics, and improved surveillance." Yet these arguments are tenuous at best. Fouchier and company have failed to show that the mutations they found in ferret experiments are likely to occur in the natural course of human outbreaks, which means that using their viruses for vaccine development would be a huge mistake.

And to claim that creating super-viruses in the lab will lead to "improved surveillance" is, frankly, laughable. Surveillance means getting out in the field and collecting samples from sick people. Gain-of-function laboratory experiments have basically nothing to do with surveillance.

Harvard's Marc Lipitsch has been one of the prominent voices arguing against this line of research, writing just last week that the scientific benefits of these experiments are very limited, for reasons detailed in his article. Lipitsch is also one of the founding members of the Cambridge Working Group.

According to the announcement from The White House, the first committee to evaluate the merit of these experiments will meet in just a few days, on 22 October. Meetings will continue throughout the winter, with recommendations expected sometime in the spring of 2015.

We have enough problems with influenza, and now with Ebola too, without scientists creating incredibly deadly new viruses that might accidentally escape their labs. Let's hope that the OSTP does the right thing and shuts down these experiments permanently.

Scientists are creating a dangerous flu strain, just to prove they can

In an outrageous display of chutzpah, a group of flu researchers led by Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands announced today, in a letter to the journal Nature, that they were planning to engineer the new H7N9 avian flu strain to give it new, possibly much more deadly capabilities.  Fouchier is the same scientist who, two years ago, adapted the highly pathogenic H5N1 flu strain so that it could be passed from human to human, which it cannot do in its natural form.  The resulting outcry delayed publication of his paper, but it eventually did appear.

Now they want to do the same thing, and much more, with the new H7N9 influenza virus, which has killed 43 people in China to date, and which epidemiologists are tracking with great concern.

They should track Fouchier and his lab instead.

Wait a second, protests Fouchier.  He promises that
"All experiments proposed by influenza investigators are subject to review by institutional biosafety committees. The committees include experts in the fields of infectious disease, immunology, biosafety, molecular biology and public health; also, members of the public represent views from outside the research community."
Sorry, but I'm not reassured.  Fouchier's group wants to do this research because it's all they know how to do - and, I suspect, because they enjoy the publicity.  Despite their claims that the research is vital to our understanding of the flu, none of their past work, including their work on H5N1, has changed our ability to respond to a pandemic.  As flu expert Michael Osterholm said in a report by the Associated Press:
"H5N1 surveillance is as haphazard today as it was two years ago. Should we do the work if it's not actually going to make a difference?"
Precisely.  Fouchier and his colleagues can't do surveillance, nor do they work on vaccine development.  They have laboratories where they can engineer the flu virus to make new strains, so that's what they want to do. Two years after their controversial H5N1 experiments, they haven't contributed to any improvement in our ability to control a pandemic, nor have they shown how to develop a better flu vaccine.  The benefits of creating a deadly new H7N9 virus are marginal, at best.

What about the risk? As reported in the Daily Mail, Fouchier and his colleague Yoshihiro Kawaoka themselves said
"H7N9's pandemic risk would rise 'exponentially' if it gained the ability to spread more easily among people."
Really?  And from this they conclude that it's a good idea to engineer a virus that can do exactly that - spread more easily among people? Are we supposed to take this risk because of some theoretical benefit from a vague "better understanding" of how mutations in the virus change its pathogenicity?

Although Fouchier is in Rotterdam, the NIH funds part of his work through the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases (NIAID).  Dr. Anthony Fauci, the head of NIAID, offered the reassurance that a special panel will review this H7N9 project, and
"If the risk is felt to be too high by this outside review, they will recommend it won't be done and we won't fund it."
Despite this additional oversight, I remain skeptical. These special panels tend to include other scientists who are very sympathetic with the work they're reviewing, as was demonstrated two years ago when the H5N1 work was published despite the grave concerns expressed by many outside the field.  I predict they will approve Fouchier and Kawaoka's experiments.

Here's a thought: put me on the panel: I've published multiple research papers on the influenza virus (including this paper in Nature and this paper on H5N1 avian flu), so I think it's fair to say I'm qualified.  But somehow I doubt they will do that.